US President Donald Trump’s renewed push to bring Greenland under American control has transformed a long-dormant geopolitical curiosity into a serious transatlantic crisis. Coming soon after a controversial US military operation that claimed the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, Trump’s remarks have unsettled allies, alarmed Denmark, and revived fears that raw power politics are returning to regions once governed by restraint and alliance norms.

The United States’ military action to seize Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro has reignited an old and deeply uncomfortable question: is the global system for maintaining peace, built around the United Nations, still capable of restraining powerful states? Coming after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and amid the continuing devastation in Gaza, the episode has sharpened doubts about whether the UN can still fulfil its most fundamental promise — preventing the unilateral use of force.

When U.S. President Donald Trump invoked the Monroe Doctrine to justify the capture of Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro, he revived one of the oldest and most contentious ideas in American foreign policy. First articulated more than two centuries ago, the doctrine has never been static. Instead, it has evolved alongside U.S. power, repeatedly reinterpreted to legitimise American dominance in the Western Hemisphere. Its latest invocation underscores how historical doctrines can be reshaped to serve contemporary strategic agendas.

Donald Trump’s dramatic seizure of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro was intended to project American resolve and deterrence. Yet far from Washington, in Beijing’s strategic circles, the episode is being read very differently. For China, the operation is less a show of strength than a narrative gift — reinforcing its long-standing argument that the United States invokes international rules selectively, upholding them when convenient and discarding them when power permits. From Taiwan to the South China Sea, Chinese officials believe Washington has handed them valuable diplomatic ammunition.

As India steps into 2026, the macroeconomic picture appears unusually comfortable. Growth is robust, inflation is benign, and financial stability risks seem contained — a rare “Goldilocks” phase, as described by the Governor of the Reserve Bank of India. Yet it is precisely because conditions are calm that India has a unique opportunity to confront one of its most persistent structural problems: the conflicted and opaque relationship between the RBI and the Ministry of Finance.